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The ideas expressed in the paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.1
1. Overview
One can readily identify monetary policy actions such as changes in the Federal Reserve's
interest rate peg.  Identification of monetary policy, where policy is thought of as a strategy for
achieving specified objectives, would also be straightforward if the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System used analytical procedures.  With analytical procedures, the
FOMC would specify an explicit objective function.  It would also specify the model it uses to decide
changes in its instrument to eliminate misses of the variables in its objective function.
However, the FOMC uses a judgmental framework.  It does not make its objectives explicit. 
Nor does it not conceive of policy as a model-based strategy that constrains period-by-period policy
actions.  Instead, monetary policy emerges from the concatenation of individual policy actions, each of
which appears optimal in the context of current economic activity.
The task of putting FOMC procedures into an analytical framework falls to the economist. 
However, the correlations one sees in the data between policy variables and macroeconomic variables
derive from both monetary policy and the public's behavior.  Disentangling the observed correlations
requires a model.
Section 2 presents a quantity theory model.  Sections 3 and 4 relate the model to FOMC
procedures in the 1980s.  Section 5 discusses how the FOMC controls nominal expenditure through
monetary control.  Section 6 examines monetary policy in the stop-go period prior to 1980.  Section 7
offers an overview.
The review of FOMC behavior since the early 1980s, presented in Sections 3 and 4, suggests
an hypothesis: when the FOMC follows a feedback rule for changing the funds rate designed to
stabilize nominal expenditure growth, it also stabilizes inflation.  In addition, the rule allows the price
system to work to stabilize real expenditure.  The paper tests this hypothesis by examining monetary
policy in the period from the mid-1960s through the end of the 1970s.  In this period, rather than
stabilizing nominal expenditure growth, the FOMC followed an activist policy by using variations in
nominal expenditure growth alternately to stimulate real economic activity and to restrain inflation.
2. The model
Because the FOMC uses an interest rate peg as its policy variable, a model must allow for
endogenous determination of the nominal money stock.  The model used here follows the extensions
to Sargent and Wallace (1975) that incorporate interest-rate smoothing by the central bank and
endogenous money (Barro 1989; Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff 1983; Dotsey and King 1983;
Goodfriend 1987; Hetzel 1995; McCallum 1981 and 1986; and VanHoose 1989).
The model embodies three key identifying restrictions.  First, the price system works to
equilibrate macroeconomic activity.  That is, after shocks, prices vary to return real variables to well-
defined values.  Second, the price level is a monetary phenomenon. Specifically, the model2
distinguishes real from nominal variables. Because the public cares in a fundamental way only about
real variables, the central bank must give nominal variables well-defined values.  Third, the public
forms its expectations in a way that conforms to the monetary policy followed by the central bank. 
When combined with the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated shocks, the model implies
that the central bank cannot control real variables in a systematic manner.
1
These identifying restrictions play a crucial role in the interpretation of monetary policy.  They
lead to an understanding of inflation control in terms of monetary control.  Such an understanding
differs from the real view of inflation control expressed in terms of control of excess capacity in product
or labor markets.  (For a expression of this view, the NAIRU model of inflation control, see Governor
Laurence Meyer, 1997).
The model presents the quantity theory in a way convenient for understanding monetary
control when the central bank employs an interest rate peg as its instrument.  Equation (1), which
results from the substitution of a Lucas supply function into an aggregate demand function,
summarizes the determination of the interest rate.  It highlights the constraints faced by the central
bank in setting an interest rate peg.  The price level results from equating equation (2), the public’s real
money demand function, with equation (3), the nominal money supply function.  As summarized in
equations (4) and (5), the central bank dominates the behavior of the money supply.
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All variables are in logarithms, except R
t .  E
t  is the expectations operator; the subscript is the
time period in which the expectation is formed.  E is an unconditional expectations operator.
                     
1 As a guide to U.S. monetary history, the model is deficient in several respects.  The mechanism by which it
generates monetary nonneutralities, monetary misperceptions, cannot explain Milton Friedman's empirical
observation that shocks to aggregate nominal demand impact on output before prices.  It also cannot explain the
duration of recession.  For these reasons, economists have turned more recently to sticky-price models.  (See the
survey in Goodfriend and King, 1997).  Also, the model does not incorporate learning about changes in the
monetary regime.  However, the model imposes enough structure to elucidate the major features of monetary
policy.3
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Equation (1) expresses the nominal interest rate as the sum of expected one period inflation
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error [p
t  - E
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t ] reflects an aggregate supply function that makes the supply of output vary
positively with price level prediction errors.  The public puts a large part of unanticipated increases in
real output into saving, which lowers the real rate of interest.  The FOMC constrains changes in its rate
peg to be unidirectional over significant periods of time.  This practice suggests the positive serial
correlation in the error z
t  of (1).
In (2), money demand depends positively on the price level and real output and negatively on
the interest rate.  In (3) money supply depends on the monetary base.  The (log) of the money-base
ratio is b1 and b
2 R
t expresses its interest sensitivity.
Equation (4) shows the policy actions of the central bank.  When it operates with an interest
rate peg, R
t  becomes its instrument.  Equation (4) could be rearranged to put R
t  on the left side to
highlight this operating procedure.  However, in a fiat-money regime, the central bank is the institution
possessing the monopoly over monetary base creation.  Even if the central bank uses a rate peg, at a
fundamental level, it still exerts its influence through control over the time-series behavior of the base.
As written, (4) shows how the central bank determines the time-series behavior of the4
monetary base through its choice of the q parameters.  The parameter q 0 sets the trend growth of the
base (and money).  Under the model assumption that the trend rate of output growth is zero, q 0 is also
the trend rate of inflation p .  The parameter q1 determines the extent to which the central bank
constrains fluctuations of the interest rate to move around an implicit reference rate.  (With x
t  = 0, q1
measures interest rate smoothing by the central bank.)  The q 2  term measures the extent to which the
central bank offsets the innovation in the monetary base it allowed in the prior period by constraining
fluctuations in the interest rate.  The q 2  parameter determines the degree of drift in prices.  (See
Goodfriend 1987, Hetzel 1995, and VanHoose 1989.)
Equation (5), a loss function, expresses the monetary policy of the central bank.  The " and (
terms express a desire to minimize financial market volatility.  The " term captures an objective to
limit fluctuations in money-market rates.  The ( term captures an objective to limit bond-rate
fluctuations, which requires limiting changes in the public's inflation forecasts.  The $ term summarizes
the objective of minimizing output fluctuations, which requires avoiding price-level forecast errors.
Assuming rational expectations, one can use equations (1)-(4) to solve for the endogenous
variables of the model as functions of the q parameters.  One then substitutes these solutions into the
loss function (5).  Given its preferences as represented by the ", $, ( parameters, the central bank
chooses the q parameters to minimize its loss function (Hetzel 1995).




1 - t R
t  + x
t , is not observed.  It is the value toward which the central bank pulls the
market rate through unanticipated money creation.  For example, when the reference rate lies below
the market rate, x
t  > 0, the central bank creates money to depress the market rate.
What must the central bank do to avoid imparting inflationary shocks to the economy?  It must
set its rate peg equal to the prior period's expectation of the nominal rate, E
1 - t R
t .  From (1), E
1 - t R
t
possesses two components.  One is c1 + j z 1 - t , the natural rate (the sustainable real rate), which
holds in the absence of price level forecast errors and transitory real shocks.  The other component is
the public's unconditional expectation of inflation, which under rational expectations equals the central
bank's target for trend inflation (p* = q 0).
3  In sum, the central bank must set its rate peg equal to the
                     
2 The value of the peg can change within the period t.  The length of the period depends upon the length of time
over which an unanticipated change in the price level affects real variables.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the US was
making the final transition from a commodity to a fiat currency monetary regime.  The former regime still
exercised enough influence that the public believed the inflation rate would behave like a stationary time series. 
For this period, the time period t can be thought of as one year.
3 In a Barro-Gordon (1983) world of time inconsistency, where the central bank’s preferred inflation target is not
credible, the public’s expectation of trend inflation may depend upon a variety of political factors beyond the




Although a central bank can use a rate peg as its instrument, in a significant sense, it cannot
control the interest rate.  First, it cannot control the natural rate.  Second, the central bank must set its
rate peg equal to the natural rate plus the public's expectation of trend inflation, which is determined
given its target.  These constraints are fundamental: the central bank must respect them to give
nominal variables well-defined values (Hetzel 1995 and McCallum 1986).  Within the confines of these
constraints, the central bank can moderate fluctuations of the interest rate.  However, it can do so only
by allowing unanticipated monetary emissions.  If it does not subsequently offset them, it will introduce
drift into the price level.
It is useful to distinguish between policy-maintaining and policy-altering changes in the rate
peg.  With the former, the central bank keeps the interest rate peg equal to the nominal natural rate
specified for an unchanged trend rate of inflation.  With the latter, the central bank moves the market
rate relative to the nominal natural rate and actively creates changes in money that alter inflation.  For
example, for x
t  > 0, the central bank pulls the rate peg down through surprise money creation that
lowers the real rate of interest.
6
The model illustrates the problem of identifying monetary policy.  One could estimate a
regression like (4) to derive estimates of the q parameters chosen by the central bank.  The estimated
q parameters, however, do not describe monetary policy as expressed by the loss function, (5).  They
are a mixture of the structural parameters from the behavioral relationships of the public, (1) and (2),
and the structural parameters from the loss (policy) function of the central bank, (5).  For example, to
minimize its loss function, the central bank chooses q1 equal to
(6)
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respectively, the variances of monetary and real shocks (Hetzel 1995).  In order to derive the policy
function of the central bank (the a, b, g parameters) one must know the model of the economy (the a, b
and c parameters).
                                                                  
this context.  At first glance, the expression seems odd.  Central banks create inflation.  Does the expression
mean the central bank is somehow fighting itself?  It probably means that the central bank’s desired inflation rate
is not credible, and it must take actions (“fight”) to lower the public’s expectation of inflation to an acceptable
level.
4 To avoid drift in the price level due to the monetary emissions that arise from real shocks with an interest rate
peg, the central bank must also set q 2  = 0.
5 The term is from Friedman (1969).
6 Because x t  by definition captures unanticipated changes, an effort by the central bank to impart serial
correlation to surprise money creation would fail.  It would alter the inflation rate through a change in q 0  and p*.6
3. Nominal expenditure targeting and the nominal natural rate
In using the model to understand FOMC procedures, it is useful to ask first what the FOMC
must do to stabilize inflation in the absence of private-sector shocks, given that it employs an interest
rate peg.  To avoid injections of money that force changes in the price level, the FOMC must set its
funds rate peg equal to the nominal natural rate - the natural rate plus the rate of inflation expected by
the public.  This task has two parts.  First, the FOMC must keep the real funds rate equal to the natural
rate.
Second, it must keep the inflation premium in the funds rate equal to the inflation rate
expected by the public.  Because the FOMC determines trend inflation, it determines both the inflation
premium in the funds rate and expected inflation.  The FOMC will maintain equality between the latter
two variables by keeping them both equal to the inflation rate it considers acceptable.  Thus, in
maintaining equality between its funds rate peg and the nominal natural rate, the FOMC tracks the
natural rate and sets the inflation premium.
With shocks, a funds rate peg will result in the periodic injection or absorption of the monetary
base, which will produce a change in the price level.  The FOMC must have a policy about price-level
drift.  Given the FOMC's target for inflation and its policy toward price-level drift, faced with the shocks
that impinge upon the economy, the public can form an expectation of the future price level.  With a
rate peg, the central bank determines the behavior of nominal variables not through exogenous control
of money, but rather by tying down the public's expectation of the future price level.
7
The most consistent characteristic of monetary policy is "leaning against the wind."  The
FOMC raises (lowers) its rate peg when economic activity and inflation strengthen (weaken).  “Lean-
against-the-wind” can be characterized as a feedback procedure running from nominal expenditure
growth to a funds rate instrument. How does this procedure equate the funds rate and the nominal
natural rate?  It does so as a consequence of varying the funds rate in a way that stabilizes nominal
expenditure growth.
As described above, the task of equating the funds rate and the nominal natural rate
possesses two components.  These two components can be related to the two components of nominal
expenditure growth: real expenditure growth and inflation.  The FOMC's implicit target for nominal
expenditure growth possesses two components: sustainable real expenditure growth and acceptable
inflation.  By targeting nominal expenditure growth, the FOMC changes the funds rate when real
expenditure growth deviates from its sustainable rate and when inflation deviates from its acceptable
rate.  The first kind of change causes the real funds rate to track the natural rate.  The second keeps
                     
7 Given this expectation, an arbitrary change in the contemporaneous price level produces a change in a relative
price: the contemporaneous price level relative to the expected future price level.  That change creates an excess
demand for money that restores the contemporaneous price level to a determinate equilibrium value (Hetzel 1988
and 1995).7
the inflation premium in the funds rate equal to the inflation rate expected by the public by keeping
both equal to the FOMC's inflation target.
Consider the first kind of funds rate change, for example, an increase in response to a rise in
real expenditure growth.  A rise in nominal expenditure growth due to a rise in real expenditure growth
relative to its sustainable value indicates that the real rate implicit in the FOMC's funds rate peg lies
below the natural rate.  Changes in the growth rate of real expenditure will be positively correlated with
changes in the natural rate if shocks to the economy are either aggregate demand or permanent
supply shocks.
Consider now the second kind of funds rate change, for example, an increase when inflation
rises.  A rise in nominal expenditure growth due to a rise in inflation relative to the FOMC’s implicit
target also indicates a divergence between the real rate implicit in the funds rate peg and the natural
rate.  Furthermore, the divergence will widen if the rise in inflation produces a rise in expected inflation
that depresses the real rate implicit in the funds rate peg.  Changes in inflation will produce positively
correlated changes in expected inflation if the public forms its expectations partly on the basis of
realized inflation rates. Given that the FOMC does not announce its inflation target and given the
inflation drift of stop-go monetary policy, it is likely that in the 1980s the public revised its expectations
of inflation at least partly in line with observed inflation.
An increase in the funds rate peg in itself sends a signal that the FOMC is unwilling to
accommodate the new, higher inflation rate. That signal helps to prevent a rise in expected inflation
and the inflation premium in the interest rate.  Also, the FOMC observes the bond rate for signs of an
increase in expected inflation.  If the FOMC is going to return the inflation rate to its original, lower
value, it must raise the funds rate by more than any increase in expected inflation the rise in actual
inflation may have produced.  If bond rates have risen, the FOMC raises the funds rate until it has
reversed the rise in bond rates. That is, it eliminates any increase in the inflation premium incorporated
into the bond rate.
4. Leaning against the wind
This section supports the characterization of FOMC procedures in the 1980s as feedback
control of nominal expenditure growth with a funds rate instrument, supplemented by a responsiveness
to bond rate behavior.  The FOMC does not make its targets explicit.  However, since July 1979, at
their February and July meetings, FOMC members have submitted predictions of growth rates for
nominal and real output, inflation, and unemployment, which the chairman presents at his Humphrey-
Hawkins testimony before Congress.  The predictions are presented as a range, which includes a
smaller range called the central tendency.  The midpoint of the central-tendency range for nominal
output growth can serve as a benchmark against which the FOMC measures the strength of the
economy.  Although, FOMC members do not prepare their predictions with the idea that they will be8
used as targets, predictions are necessarily contingent on the monetary policy they expect to be
adopted.  In this sense, the suggested benchmark represents an acceptable outcome to the majority
that can be used as a proxy for targeted values.
8
In Figure 1, the solid line is the midpoint of the central tendency range of FOMC members'
predictions of nominal GDP growth presented in the most recent Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.  The
dashed line shows Board staff (Greenbook) predictions of the quarterly annualized growth rate of
nominal GDP made prior to FOMC meetings.
9  Figure 2 shows deviations between the predicted and
benchmark growth rates in Figure 1 (the dashed minus the solid line).  These deviations proxy for
misses of nominal GDP growth from the FOMC's implicit target.  Figure 2 plots these misses with
changes in the FOMC's funds rate peg.
10
In principle, Figure 2 should measure changes in the funds rate relative to a path assumed for
the forecasts.  Imagine that the FOMC conceives of monetary policy as a contingent plan.  It would
then set a path for nominal expenditure growth equal to the sum of the trend and cyclical components
of real expenditure growth plus an objective for inflation.  Achievement of the desired growth in
nominal expenditure would be contingent on realization of the assumed funds rate path.  As long as
nominal expenditure grew as anticipated, the FOMC would move the funds rate along this path.  To
eliminate deviations of nominal expenditure from its desired path, the FOMC would move the funds
rate relative to its path.
The FOMC does not discuss such a path and Board documents do not reveal the funds rate
path assumed in Greenbook forecasts.  This lack of knowledge would be important if the FOMC could
make reasonably accurate forecasts of nominal GDP growth based on an assumed path for the funds
rate.  That is, the path would be important if the FOMC used feed-forward rather than simple feedback
control procedures.  However, evidence on the accuracy of Greenbook forecasts indicates that they
contain useful information about the contemporaneous quarter as long as some hard data are available
for that quarter, but very little useful information about future quarters.
11  FOMC procedures are
                     
8 For 1980 through 1997, the correlation between four-quarter forecasts of nominal output growth in the
Greenbook for the February FOMC meeting and the Humphrey-Hawkins figure used as a proxy for the FOMC’s
objective for nominal output growth is .94.  Over a four-quarter time horizon, nominal output growth is under the
control of the FOMC to a significant extent.  The agreement between Board staff and FOMC member “forecasts”
indicates broad underlying agreement on the acceptable outcome for nominal output growth.
9 For a discussion of FOMC procedures and documents, see Lombra and Moran (1980).
10 The prediction is for the quarter in which the FOMC meeting occurred if the meeting is in one of the first two
months of a quarter and for the subsequent quarter if the meeting is in the last month of a quarter.  There were
11 FOMC meetings in 1980 and 8 per year thereafter.  The funds rate peg is the value the Open Market Desk
expected to prevail at the beginning of the first full reserve settlement period following an FOMC meeting and is
taken from the Desk's annual reports.  Because the Greenbook remains confidential for five full calendar years
after FOMC meetings, the graphs end with 1991.
11  See Joust and Stekler (1997).  Hetzel and Olmem (1997) examine how well the Greenbook forecasts “final”
GDP figures, that is, the figures released at the end of the third month in the quarter following the forecasted
quarter.  For the period January 1980 through December 1996, for Greenbook forecasts of annualized quarterly
growth rates of GDP (GNP before December 1991) made in the third month of the quarter preceding the9
therefore aptly characterized as simple feedback control.  The FOMC moves its funds peg away from
its prevailing value (subject to smoothing constraints) on the basis of the deviation of
contemporaneous nominal expenditure growth from target.
The triangles of Figure 2 correspond to episodes when the FOMC raised the funds rate in the
absence of economic strength relative to the Humphrey-Hawkins benchmarks.  The triangles of Figure
3, which shows the bond rate, correspond to those on Figure 2.  As indicated by Figure 3, these
episodes reveal increases in bond rates that the FOMC interpreted as evidence of a rise in inflationary
expectations (Goodfriend 1992).
12  They identify policy actions that exerted an independent impact on
the real interest rate.  At these times, the FOMC departed from its lean-against-the-wind procedures by
raising the funds rate despite the absence of unusual strength in the economy.  Instead of tracking the
real rate, the FOMC induced a temporary rise in it.  Funds rate changes were policy-altering.
Figure 2 shows a positive correlation of changes in the FOMC's funds rate peg with misses
between predicted nominal GDP growth and the Humphrey-Hawkins benchmark.  From the February
1983 FOMC meeting through the December 1992 meeting, the correlation between funds rate changes
and misses from target of nominal output growth calculated from Greenbook predictions is .49.  One
can also construct a target path in level form for nominal output that is the analogue of the target
growth rates shown in Figure 1.  The target level rises from the level of nominal output in the fourth
quarter of the preceding year at a rate given by the midpoint of the FOMC's central tendency range for
four-quarter nominal output growth announced at the previous Humphrey-Hawkins hearings.  The
correlation between the resulting differences in predicted and targeted levels of nominal output and
changes in the funds rate is .58 over the period 1983 through 1991.
13
Table 1 shows a regression of the changes in the funds rate of Figure 2 on this latter measure
of the difference between the predicted and benchmark level of nominal output. It also includes
intermeeting changes in the 30-year Treasury bond rate the day before the FOMC meeting.  As shown,
for the period from February 1983 through December 1991, there is a positive correlation of changes
in the FOMC's target for the funds rate with both nominal output misses and changes in the 30-year
                                                                  
forecasted quarter, the standard deviation of the forecast errors is 2.8.  That is, a 95 percent confidence interval
would be 5.6 percentage points.  Replacing these forecasts of the succeeding quarter with a naïve forecast, taken
as the forecasted value of the contemporaneous quarter made at the same time, yields predictions almost as
accurate.  With the naïve forecast, the standard deviation of the forecast errors is 3.0.
12 The FOMC operates with discretion in a political system that regularly pressures it for an expansionary policy. 
As a result, the FOMC must worry about its credibility to control inflation.  In Goodfriend’s terminology, in the
1980s, the FOMC periodically had to put down "inflation scares."
13 The end of 1982 marks the end of the nonborrowed-reserves procedures adopted October 1979.  Also, the
initial period of Volcker's tenure as chairman, August 1979 through 1982, can be thought of as the final stop
phase of the preceding stop-go period. In this sense, 1983 marks the year the FOMC moved toward stabilizing
nominal expenditure growth.  (The generalization holds relative to the earlier period as monetary policy was
moderately expansionary in the mid-1980s and moderately contractionary toward the end of the 1980s.)  1991 is
the last year for which Greenbook predictions are available.10
bond yield.
14
A measure of capacity utilization could add explanatory power to the regression explaining
changes in the funds rate peg.  For example, real expenditure might grow at an unexpectedly high rate
without a decline in measures of excess capacity.  The FOMC might then conclude that it had
underestimated the sustainable rate of growth of real expenditure and not raise its rate peg. 
Comments by Chairman Greenspan suggest that the FOMC watches the National Association of
Purchasing Manager's supplier delivery index as a measure of excess capacity.
15  However, including
such a variable did not improve the fit of the regression in Table 1.
16,
17
Figures 2 and 3 summarize policy actions for the period 1980 through 1992.  Monetary policy
has altered in one important respect since the early 1990s: the FOMC has increased its traditional
reluctance to make changes in its rate peg that might need to be reversed shortly.  Faced with, say,
incipient unsustainable strength in economic activity, the FOMC waits before raising its funds rate peg
                     
14 Mehra (1997) documents the increased responsiveness after Paul Volcker became Fed chairman of the FOMC
to bond yields as measures of expected inflation offers.  In his abstract, he states, "In the pre-1979 period, when
the bond rate rose above the one-period inflation rate, actual inflation accelerated.  In the post-1979 period,
however, the bond rate reverted back and actual inflation did not accelerate.  Thus, the bond rate signaled future
inflation in the period before 1979, but not thereafter.  The results here indicate that in the period after 1979 Fed
policy prevented any pickup in inflationary expectations (evidenced by the rise in the bond rate) from getting
reflected in higher actual inflation."
15 In response to a question by Senator Bingaman, Chairman Greenspan [U.S. Congress, 3/20/97] responded:
"Maximum sustainable growth requires . . . definition.  It would require us to define where we would be when
serious pressures on resources began to emerge.  In other words, when we began to see that manufacturers
were having difficulty meeting their delivery schedules, and, therefore, the lead times on the deliveries to
customers would stretch out. . . . they don't have enough facilities to produce."
16 The R-squared of the regression of Table 1 did not improve when the variable was included both as a first
difference and as the difference between its value and the benchmark level of 50.
17 A number of factors lower the correlation between changes in the funds rate and misses of predicted
expenditure growth from the Humphrey-Hawkins benchmark.  However, none conflict with the idea that the
FOMC targets nominal expenditure growth.  1) The FOMC does not adjust the funds rate immediately in
response to weakness or strength in economic activity because it tries to avoid short-run reversals of its rate peg.
 2) The proxy for the FOMC's target for nominal output growth is imperfect.  Also, the target can vary in an
ongoing way.  If nominal expenditure growth differs from its benchmark because of special factors, the FOMC
may not alter the funds rate.  3) The FOMC need not accept Board staff forecasts.  Regional Bank presidents
especially rely on a wide variety of anecdotal information in assessing the strength of the economy.  The two
most important sources for this information are regional surveys reported in the Beige Book and monthly
roundtable discussions on regional economic conditions with the Banks' directors.
4) The FOMC's decision about the funds rate peg involves discrete changes, while target misses evolve
continuously.  5) Many factors involving the timing of funds rate changes introduce noise. For example, the
chairman typically only agrees to change the funds rate when he has enough of a consensus among voting
FOMC members to avoid a significant number of dissents.  The chairman tries to time changes in the funds rate
peg so that they look right in light of incoming data on the economy, for example, by having a decrease follow
release of a weak payroll employment number.  6) When the FOMC has moved the funds rate, it may wait for a
while to watch for an effect on the economy.  7) The proxy used for the FOMC's nominal output target weighs
equally all FOMC members' predictions instead of recognizing the dominant role of the chairman.  Fed chairmen
may alter the FOMC's implicit target for nominal output growth tactically and without explicit statement in
response to ongoing changes in the political environment.11
until sufficient time has elapsed to determine that the strength is permanent.
18  For example, the
economy grew strongly in 1996Q2 (real GDP grew at an annualized rate of about 6 percent), but the
FOMC waited for information on 1996Q3 before raising the rate peg.  When growth moderated, the
FOMC kept its rate peg unchanged.
19  Increased credibility has made this wait-and-see practice
possible.  Much of that credibility came from stability of inflation.  CPI inflation averaged 2.9 percent
from 1991 through 1996, with the highest annual rate 3.3 percent in 1996. “Wait-and-see” requires that
markets believe the FOMC will raise its rate peg by enough to contain inflation if incipient strength in
economic activity turns out to be persistent rather than transitory.  The FOMC in fact did so in 1994.  In
contrast, in the pre-1980 period, the FOMC also practiced wait-and-see, but was unwilling to raise its
rate peg sharply enough to prevent drift in inflation.
20
The hypothesis advanced here is that the FOMC causes the funds rate peg to equal the
nominal natural rate by stabilizing the growth rate of nominal expenditure.  In doing so, it eliminates
money supply shocks.  Furthermore, the rate peg eliminates money demand shocks.  In the absence
of monetary shocks, the observed economy would approach a real business cycle model.  The
relationship between the real interest rate and fluctuations in growth rates of real expenditure would
then offer information about the structure of the economy independent of monetary complications. 
However, even if the U.S. has moved a considerable distance toward such a world, interest-rate
smoothing by the FOMC still causes term-structure effects.  That is, rate smoothing decreases
volatility of rates at the short end, but then must increase volatility at the long end.
Figure 4 illustrates these points.  It shows the 30-year bond rate lagged 4 quarters (with an
inverted scale) and the four-quarter rate of growth of real GDP.
21  Increases (decreases) in the bond
                     
18 In this sense, the FOMC has increased the extent to which it smoothes interest rates.  However, such
smoothing is different than the kind discussed in Poole (1970).  With the latter, the central bank sets its rate peg
initially at a value such that expected future changes are zero and then limits the magnitude of changes until it
gains sufficient additional information to determine whether the shocks impinging on the economy are real or
nominal.  Smoothing as practiced by the FOMC does limit short-lived fluctuations in short-term interest rates. 
However, on those occasions when emerging strength in economic activity turns out to be permanent rather than
transitory, the FOMC must raise its rate peg by more than if it had raised the peg promptly.  The FOMC takes out
high frequency movements in short-term rates, but imparts additional volatility at lower frequencies.
19 The FOMC smoothes in this way to avoid political criticism.  If it were to raise its funds rate peg in response to
incipient strength in economic activity and that strength subsequently dissipated, it would have to reverse the
initial rise.  Politicians would then criticize the Fed for killing off economic growth.
20 It is unclear how much of the increased credibility resides with the Fed as an institution as opposed to the
person of its chairman, Alan Greenspan.  If the FOMC pursued analytical procedures, with explicit goals and an
articulated strategy for achieving those goals, then the public would associate the low inflation of the 1990s with
the Fed as an institution and with its procedures.  However, the chairman embodies the judgmental procedures of
the FOMC.  To a significant extent, each new chairman must reestablish the credibility of his commitment to low
inflation.
21 The graph is from Brinner and Wyss, 1997.  A  graph with a ten-year real bond rate looks about the same
when the real rate is measured as the ten-year Treasury constant-maturity rate minus the predicted ten-year
inflation rate from the Philadelphia Fed Survey of Professional Forecasters.  The implication is that in the 1990s
changes in real rates rather than inflation expectations have been the primary determinants of fluctuations in
bond rates.12
rate restrain (stimulate) real growth.  Given the recent stability the FOMC has imparted to nominal
expenditure growth, Figure 4 shows how the real rate of interest equilibrates real sector shocks. 
However, “wait-and-see” smoothing affects the behavior of the term structure.  For example, when the
economy strengthened in 1996Q2 and the strength turned out to be transitory, bond yields rose and
then fell with no change in the rate peg.  In contrast, when the economy strengthened in 1994 and the
strength turned out to be sustained, bond rates rose but the FOMC’s rate peg ultimately rose more.
A key characteristic of monetary policy since the early 1980s has been the stability of the
FOMC’s implicit target for nominal expenditure growth, as measured by the midpoint of the central
tendency range presented by the chairman during his February Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.  This
benchmark figure moved down in three stages.  From 1980 to 1985, it averaged about 9 percent, with
a range of 2.75 (minimum of 7.75 and maximum of 10.5 percent).  From 1986 to 1990, it averaged
about 6.5 percent, with a range of 1.5 percent (minimum of about 5.5 and maximum of 7 percent). 
From 1991 to 1997, it averaged about 5 percent, with a range of 1.25 percent (minimum of 4.5 and
maximum of 5.75 percent).
Actual nominal output growth moved down irregularly in the 1980s as the FOMC moved to
lower inflation (Figure 5).  Apart from 1991, which was a year of recession, the 1990s exhibit
considerable stability.  Annual figures for nominal GDP growth from 1990 through 1997 moved closely
around the 5 percent average figure.  The annual figures from 1990 to 1997 are, respectively, 5.6, 3.0,
5.5, 5.0, 5.9, 4.6, 5.1, and 5.9 percent.
22
The FOMC used a Friedman k-percent rule, but for nominal expenditure, not money.  If money
demand is unstable or highly interest elastic, then monetary policy provides nominal stability by
stabilizing the growth of nominal expenditure rather than money.  By stabilizing growth of nominal
expenditure, the FOMC allows the price system maximum latitude to stabilize real growth.
23
5. Control of nominal expenditure
As described above, nominal expenditure growth is an indicator variable.  Deviations of
nominal expenditure growth from its implicit target (sustainable real expenditure growth plus targeted
inflation) signal deviations of the funds rate peg from the nominal natural rate.
24  Nominal expenditure
                                                                  
22 The result has been considerable stability of inflation. In 1983, the year-over-year annual rate of CPI inflation
(excluding food and energy) was 4.0 percent.  The greatest subsequent deviations occurred in 1984 and 1990,
when inflation rose to 5.0 percent, and 1994, when it fell to 2.8 percent.  Over the 13 year period from 1983 to
1996, the range of annual inflation rates was only 2.2 percentage points.
23 However, by operating with a rate peg, even though the FOMC follows a procedure that causes the real funds
rate to track the economy’s equilibrium real rate, the FOMC can take credit for the self-equilibrating character of
the economy.
24 Given the model, nominal expenditure growth is not an intermediate target.  One of its components, real
expenditure growth, cannot be controlled systematically by the FOMC, and the other component, inflation, is an13
growth is also an objective.  Given the trend rate of growth of real output, nominal expenditure growth
determines inflation.  Nominal expenditure growth and inflation are interchangeable FOMC objectives.
FOMC control of nominal expenditure growth can be understood in terms of the monetary
determinants of nominal expenditure.
25
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Equation (7) is the equation of exchange (in logarithmic form).  Velocity, the bracketed left-hand-side
term, varies with the interest rate and with random shifts in money demand.  The right-hand side is
nominal expenditure: the price level times real expenditure.  In (logarithmic) first differences, (7) is
(8) Dm + DV = Dy ,
where Dm, DV, and Dy are percentage changes in money, velocity, and nominal expenditure.  Nominal
expenditure depends upon the combined effect of Dm and DV.  Changes in money depend upon the
difference between the rate peg and the reference rate [R
t  - (E
1 - t R
t  + x
t )] and upon expected
inflation. Changes in velocity depend upon the level of the interest rate R
t  and shifts to money
demand.
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The regression of Table 2 gives empirical content to velocity. It predicts changes in M2
velocity by changes in the opportunity cost of holding M2, measured as the commercial paper rate
minus the own rate on M2 (R - RM2).
27  A weighted average of the contemporaneous and lagged
                                                                  
objective.
25 The FOMC need not understand its procedures in terms of money creation or monetary control.  It need not
(and generally does not) take the behavior of money into consideration when setting its funds rate peg.  Monetary
acceleration does indicate a divergence between the funds rate and the nominal natural rate.  However, because
of noise in the monetary aggregates, such as changing seasonals, and because of the variability of money
demand, identifying a change in the trend rate of growth of money requires a considerable period of time
(generally about six months).  Most of the changes the FOMC makes in its rate peg are policy-maintaining
changes that involve tracking fluctuations in the natural rate of interest.  For such changes, the FOMC relies on
data on the real economy.
26 Before 1981, the interest inelasticity of M1 demand meant that in predicting nominal expenditure one could use
the behavior of the quantity of M1 while ignoring the behavior of M1 velocity.  With the introduction nationwide of
interest-bearing checking accounts in 1981, M1 demand became interest elastic and this simplicity disappeared. 
Unlike M1, the M2 demand function remained stable (Hetzel and Mehra 1989).  However, because of the high
interest elasticity of M2 demand, in relating the behavior of M2 to nominal expenditure, one must account for the
behavior of its velocity.  For example, as interest rates rise in economic recovery, initially, much of the
expansionary impact of monetary policy comes from rising velocity (Hetzel 1992).
27 For a fuller discussion, see Hetzel (1992).  Following Friedman and Schwartz (1982, Section 6.6.3), the
regression uses percentage changes in nominal output (GDP) to capture the nominal yield on physical assets. 14
change in the opportunity cost variable, with the estimated coefficients from the regression used as
weights, shown in (9), yields predicted changes in M2 velocity.
(9) DV[D(R t  - RM2 t )] = 1.12 D(R t  - RM2 t ) + 1.22 D(R 1 - t  - RM2 1 - t )
Equation (8) becomes operational as a predictor of nominal expenditure by using actual changes in M2
for Dm and predicted changes in M2 velocity, from (9), for DV.
The dashed line in Figure 5 shows the resulting measure of the monetary determinants of
nominal expenditure.  The solid line shows actual percentage changes in nominal GDP growth. 
Although the actual series exhibits greater cyclical amplitude, the two series generally move together. 
Their common movement demonstrates the stability of the public's demand for M2, apart from the
period 1991 to 1994 when the M2 demand function shifted leftward.
28  The correspondence between
drops in the dashed line and business cycle troughs, denoted by T, reveals that weakness in the
monetary determinants of nominal expenditure corresponds to troughs in real economic activity.  This
correspondence, however, does not reveal the direction of causation.
Identifying when money constituted an independent disturbance requires determining when
shocks produced divergences in the two sides of (7) at the prevailing price level.  The price level had
to adjust when the central bank created money by setting its rate peg below the nominal natural rate. 
The empirical hypothesis advanced here is that this situation occurred when the FOMC imparted a
persistent inertia to its rate peg relative to changes in the growth rate of nominal expenditure.
The preceding sections applied a model to the record of monetary policy actions to infer the
character of monetary policy in the period following the early 1980s.  It concluded that the FOMC
followed a simple feedback procedure for controlling nominal expenditure growth with a funds rate
instrument.  Stabilizing nominal expenditure growth caused the FOMC to vary its funds rate peg in a
way that tracked the nominal natural rate, thus providing for the monetary control necessary to
stabilize inflation.  The variability in inflation prior to the early 1980s allows a test of this
characterization of monetary policy.  Did the FOMC employ procedures for setting its funds rate peg in
the earlier period that reversed the key characteristics of the later procedures?
Two key changes occurred.  First, in the early 1980s, the FOMC quickened the response of
changes in the funds rate to changes in nominal output growth.  Over the period 1983Q1 through
1992Q4, the correlation between quarterly percentage changes in the funds rate and quarterly
                                                                  
The estimation ends in 1990 to avoid the leftward shift in M2 demand produced by the rise in bond and stock
mutual funds (Hetzel and Darin 1994). As shown in Figure 5, the pre-1990 M2 demand function ceased shifting
leftward after 1994.
28 The issue of whether money demand is stable is different from the assumption of the model in section 2 that
the price level is a monetary phenomenon.  Given the latter assumption, regardless of the stability of money
demand, the central bank controls the price level through procedures that provide for monetary control.15
percentage changes in contemporaneous nominal output and nominal output lagged one and two
quarters is, .48, .61 and .36, respectively.  In contrast, over the period 1966Q1 through 1979Q4, these
correlations (.16, .43 and .26, respectively) fall off, especially the contemporaneous correlation.
29 
Second, in the early 1980s, the FOMC began to interpret increases in bond rates as evidence of a rise
in inflationary expectations, which moved it to raise its funds rate peg.  In contrast, prior to the 1980s,
the FOMC at times interpreted a rise in bond rates in itself as evidence that monetary policy had
become tighter. (See, for example, FOMC Memorandum of Discussion, 3/9/71, pp. 266-7.)  The
following section summarizes the stop-go monetary policy that began in the mid-1960s.
6. Stop-go monetary policy
Over the period 1965 through the end of the 1970s, monetary policy earned the appellation
“stop-go” from the FOMC’s alternate concentration on reducing inflation and stimulating economic
activity.  The following empirical review attempts to identify this pattern.  Identification of the influence
of monetary policy in economic time series requires both a model and empirical observations about
policymaking.  Identification makes use of the model exposited earlier, where attempts by the
monetary authority to limit increases in interest rates resulting from strength in economic activity result
in monetary accelerations and inflation, and conversely for weakness in economic activity. 
Identification also makes use of the documented reluctance of the FOMC to raise its funds rate peg
during periods of economic recovery and to lower the peg at the onset of periods of economic
weakness.
The data examined below do not allow identification of an FOMC reaction function, which
would reveal FOMC targets for real output growth and inflation and the response of the funds rate peg
to misses in these targets.  However, the data do reveal significant interest rate smoothing by the
FOMC over the business cycle.  That smoothing was the counterpart of an activist monetary policy of
manipulating nominal expenditure.  During economic recovery, through the monetary acceleration
produced by restraining increases in its funds rate peg, the FOMC engendered relatively high rates of
growth of nominal expenditure in an attempt to stimulate real output growth.  Conversely, during
economic decline, through the monetary deceleration produced by restraining declines in its funds rate
peg, the FOMC engendered relatively low rates of growth of nominal expenditure in an attempt to
lower inflation.
                     
29 The correlations for 1993Q1 to 1997Q4 (-.14, .29 and .26) revert to the earlier pattern.  The low
contemporaneous correlation reflects a return to “wait and see” rate smoothing, as explained above.  However, in
the later period, the FOMC has maintained the confidence of the markets that if incipient strength turns out to be
permanent rather than transitory, it will raise the funds rate by whatever amount necessary to prevent a rise in
inflation.  The increased credibility has also caused the FOMC to interpret increases in bond rates as increases in
the real rate rather than the inflation premium.16
Figures 6, 7 and 8 display data available to the FOMC at the time of its meetings.
30  Figure 6
plots the most recent annualized three-month M1 growth rate available to the FOMC at the time of its
meetings and fits a step function to this series.  It also plots the funds rate following the meeting. 
Figure 7 plots the most recently available figure for the annualized three-month rate of CPI inflation
and the unemployment rate.  Figure 8 plots the most recently available figure for the three-month
growth rate of industrial production and the real rate of interest.  The latter is calculated as the
commercial paper rate minus the inflation rate predicted by the staff of the Board of Governors in the
Greenbook, which is circulated prior to FOMC meetings.  (The real rate series starts in November 1965
when Greenbook forecasts begin.)
Figures 6, 7 and 8 divide the four go-stop cycles of the period from 1965 through 1981 into
three phases.  Phase 1 demarcates those intervals over which the FOMC placed a higher priority on
encouraging real growth than on controlling inflation.  The FOMC kept its funds rate peg at a level that
produced a monetary acceleration.  Phase 1 became phase 1a when the FOMC became willing to
raise its rate peg.  In phase 1a, strengthening real growth and rising inflation caused the FOMC to raise
the funds rate peg, but not by enough to prevent continued high money growth.
By the end of phase 1a intervals, inflation had become the predominant concern of the FOMC.
 Phase 1a became phase 2 when M1 growth began to fall.  In phase 2, the FOMC initially maintained a
high funds rate peg despite monetary deceleration and a decline in economic activity.  By the end of
phase 2, the FOMC had become more concerned with deteriorating real growth than inflation.  Phase 2
became a new phase 1 when the FOMC began to lower the funds rate.
Table 3 summarizes the information contained in Figures 6, 7 and 8.
31  Again, phase 1
demarcates intervals over which the FOMC was concerned primarily with the real sector rather than
inflation. In all phase 1 intervals except the second, where growth of industrial production fell sharply,
the unemployment rate was at a level considered unacceptable (col. 10).  (In Figure 7, the dashed axis
marks 4 percent unemployment, which was equated with full employment until the mid-1970s.)  Growth
of industrial production fell from the preceding phase (col. 7).  The inflation rate either remained low or
declined until well into the phase (cols. 8 and 9).
In phase 1, the FOMC kept the funds rate at a level that produced a monetary acceleration. 
The funds rate fell over the duration of phase 1 except in the first phase, which is anomalous as the
first phase of the four go-stop cycles (col. 3).  The average funds rate also fell relative to the prior
phase 2 (col. 2), as did the real rate of interest (col. 5).  During phase 1, M1 growth, expressed as a
step function, rose (col. 12).  Over the four phases, it rose on average by 5.2 percentage points.
Phase 1a started when the FOMC became willing to let the funds rate rise.  It marked a
transitional phase in FOMC priorities away from real growth and toward inflation.  The unemployment
                     
30 An appendix describing the construction of the data series and listing the data is available from the author.
31 An appendix, available from the author, provides a detailed analysis.17
rate either reached or moved toward cyclical lows (col. 11). Industrial production grew strongly and
growth rates rose relative to phase 1 (cols. 6 and 7).  Over the course of phase 1a intervals, inflation
rose strongly (col. 9).  (The exception is the third phase 1a, April 1971 to March 1973, in which price
controls constrained the rise in inflation until the end.  In April 1973, the FOMC saw inflation soar.) 
During phases 1a, the FOMC began to let the funds rate rise, but not by enough to let the real rate of
interest rise appreciably (col. 5).  Nor did the funds rate rise enough to constrain the monetary
acceleration begun in phase 1.
During phase 2 intervals, the FOMC concentrated on reducing inflation.  They started when M1
growth began to fall.  The unemployment rate remained relatively low in phase 2 (cols. 10 and 11). 
Industrial production grew strongly at the beginning, but declined as the phase progressed and fell
relative to phase 1a (col. 7).  Inflation rose in phase 2 (cols. 8 and 9).  (In the fourth phase 2, it
declined after rising sharply, but remained high.)
The funds rate and real rate rose in phase 2 (cols. 2, 3 and 5).  (The exception was the very
short phase 2 from July 1966 to October 1966, where the Board of Governors pressured banks into
rationing credit quantitatively rather than through a rise in interest rates.)  The M1 step function fell
strongly at the beginning of all phase 2 intervals (col. 12).  The decline in economic activity toward the
end of phase 2 caused the FOMC's priority to shift away from inflation.  The stop phase then became
the next go phase 1 when the FOMC began to lower the funds rate.
Table 4 shows the lags in the significant turning points in the series, marked by the dots on the
figures.  The lags of the second cycle are typical.  On March 1969, the FOMC saw the three-month M1
growth rate decline, and the M1 step function moved down from 6.5 to 2 percent.  The FOMC then saw
three-month growth rates of industrial production turn down in September 1969 and become negative
in November.  The funds rate did not peak until January 1970, and the real rate peaked the same
month.  Note also that the real rate reached its peak 4 months after the peak in growth of industrial
production.  The inflation rate peaked only in June 1970.
The lags just detailed are evidence of a monetary policy that imparted considerable inertia
over the business cycle to the short-term rate of interest.  The identifying assumptions used to extract
the influence of policy from the data are a combination of the model exposited in Section 2, which
allows for short-run monetary nonneutralities, and the empirical observation that during this period the
FOMC postponed lowering its interest-rate peg in response to weakening economic activity out of a
concern for inflation.
32
Identification of monetary policy is valid only if the model is valid.  A quantity-theory model
that allows for nonneutrality of money does explain the lags shown in Table 4 in a straightforward way.
                     
32 For example, in 1967 and the first half of 1968, Chairman Martin had resisted raising interest rates despite
strong real growth and rising inflation because he had wanted to encourage Congress to pass the income tax
surcharge, which he believed would cool off the economy and inflation.  After the passage of the surcharge in
June 1968, he lowered the funds rate.  Despite the tax hike, the economy continued booming.  In early 1969,
Martin raised rates and intended keep them high until inflation disappeared.18
 As shown, across the four cycles, first, the rate of growth of M1 peaked, then the rate of growth of
industrial production, and then the funds rate and the real rate.  As a result as these lags, there is an
initial negative correlation between changes in the rate of growth of industrial production and the real
rate (the former falls while the latter continues rising).  Then, after the real rate peaks, the two series
are positively correlated (both fall).  Monetary nonneutrality in the form of a liquidity effect explains the
initial negative correlation.  In contrast, a model that does not allow for monetary nonneutralities must
assume that the nature of the shock affecting the economy changed to get the observed change in the
sign of the correlation between changes in growth of industrial production and the real rate.  And even
then, such a model must still explain the turning points in money.
Of course, the data on lags do not themselves reveal the causal relationships assumed above.
 In particular, the above explanation attributes causal significance to the fact that peaks in M1 growth
preceded peaks in the real rate.  That is, a monetary deceleration produced a rise in the real rate.  One
could instead assume that the real rate is entirely determined by real factors and the behavior of the
real rate causes M1 growth.  In that event, the relevant timing relationship would run from the trough in
the real rate to the peak in M1 growth.  The rise in the real rate would then cause the subsequent fall in
M1 growth.
The argument in favor of the prior explanation that assigns causal significance to money
depends upon the empirical assumption that the FOMC put inertia into changes in the funds rate over
the stop-go period.  With inertia in the funds rate and a rising equilibrium real rate of interest, prior to
the peak in M1 growth, the real funds rate would tend to fall below the equilibrium real rate.  That is,
the FOMC’s funds rate peg would be too low.  That relationship should produce a monetary
acceleration.  But instead, money growth peaked and a monetary deceleration occurred.
With two empirical supplements, the quantity-theory model of Section 2 predicts the monetary
accelerations and decelerations of the stop-go period.  The first is the empirical observation of cyclical
interest rate smoothing by the FOMC described above.  The second is the empirical hypothesis that
changes in the rate of growth of nominal output relative to the funds rate indicate discrepancies
between the nominal natural rate and the funds rate.
Figure 9 shows the inertia in the funds rate relative to changes in nominal output growth (GDP)
and the associated monetary accelerations and decelerations (quarterly data from 1997 time-series). 
Arrows connect turning points in nominal output growth and the funds rate running from peak to peak
and trough to trough.  Table 5 shows dates of the turning points in nominal output growth and the funds
rate and the lags in quarters.  It also shows the associated shift in the M1 step function.
Two short-lived, low M1 steps break the pattern of steady monetary acceleration in phases 1a
shown in Figure 6.  As only temporary interruptions to sustained monetary stimulus, they could have
been submerged in the broader high M1 steps.  Nevertheless, as individual episodes, they illustrate the
relationship between money growth and the funds rate relative to the nominal natural rate.  The first19
aberrant low M1 step runs from October 1971 to February 1972.
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In late 1970 and early 1971, the FOMC pushed the funds rate down sharply to 3.5 percent in
March 1971 (Figure 6).  From February through June 1971, the real commercial paper rate averaged
only .3 percent (Figure 8).  M1 growth surged into low double-digits in this period (Figure 6).  Over the
longer period from November 1965 through January 1971, the real interest rate averaged 2.9 percent. 
The only previous period of comparably low real rates had been July 1967 to November 1967, when
real rates had averaged 1.4 percent.  M1 growth also surged into the low double digits in this period.
President Nixon imposed wage and price controls on August 15, 1971.  The announcement of
controls produced a widespread expectation of a reduction in inflation, captured in Board staff
forecasts.  With little change in the funds rate, the real rate rose from .8 in July to 3.3 percent in
September.  At the same time, M1 growth fell sharply.  The FOMC pushed the funds rate down to 3.25
in February 1972, and the real rate fell to zero.  M1 then grew rapidly in 1972.  It seems clear that the
policy actions of this period, both funds rate changes and the announcement effects of wage and price
controls, moved the real funds rate relative to the economy’s natural rate and generated large
fluctuations in money growth.
The second low M1 step to interrupt a sustained period of high M1 growth was from December
1978 to April 1979 (the figures are dated as seen by the FOMC, Figure 6).  Inflation rose rapidly in
1978, from a low near 4 percent in the beginning of the year to 12 percent in July.  The foreign
exchange value of the dollar fell sharply.  In response, the FOMC raised its rate peg from 6.75 in
January to almost 10 percent in November 1978.  The real rate rose from zero in April and May to 2.5
percent by December 1978.  M1 growth fell from 9 percent over the period January through September
1978 to less than 5 percent from October 1978 through February 1979.
Early in 1979, the Board staff predicted a recession, and the FOMC retreated from further
funds rate increases.  As inflation rose again in 1979, expected inflation rose.  With an unchanged
funds rate, the real interest rate fell to zero in April 1979 and M1 growth rose back to double digits. 
The FOMC began to push the funds rate up again in August when Paul Volcker became Fed chairman.
One could argue that monetary restriction began in December 1978, followed by a short-lived
relapse.  For that reason, Figures 6a, 7a and 8a offer two alternative dates for the peak in M1 growth:
November 1978 and October 1979.  The first offers a better explanation for the growth of industrial
production, which fell after April 1979, but revived in early 1980. The Carter credit controls, imposed in
March 1980 and abandoned in July 1980, add a short-lived bust-boom cycle that obscures the longer
phase of disinflation.  On March 15, 1980, the Fed implemented the credit control program and pushed
the funds rate up to 17.8 percent.  At its May and July meetings, the FOMC saw 3-month M1 growth
rates fall to zero, and the funds rate fell to 9 percent following the July meeting.  The abandonment of
                     
33 The dates correspond to the period over which the FOMC saw M1 growth as low as shown in Figure 6.  The
actual period of low M1 growth was from August 1971 to December 1971.20
the controls in July led to a resurgence of money growth - the M1 step function rose to 14.5 percent
over the August to December 1980 period.  Growth rates of industrial production declined and then
rose dramatically with the imposition and lifting of the credit controls.
Over the longer period, the funds rate rose steadily and peaked at 20 percent in May 1981
(Figure 6a).  The M1 step function fell to 1.9 percent from February through December 1981.
34  July
1981 is a peak in the business cycle.
7. A summary of monetary policy
The paper uses a quantity-theory model to summarize monetary policy.  The price level
emerges out of the interaction between a nominal money supply function (whose behavior is
dominated by the central bank) and a real money demand function (whose behavior is dominated by
the public).  The model makes a basic assumption about the rationality of individuals: their well-being
depends upon real, not nominal, variables.  Because the central bank ultimately controls only the
monetary base, a nominal variable, and because the public cares about real variables, within an
appropriate time horizon, the public rather than the central bank determines real magnitudes, such as
the real quantity of money and real expenditure.  The central bank determines nominal magnitudes,
especially the price level.  To do so, it must control a nominal variable.
On the money demand side of price level determination, the public controls a real variable -
the ratio of nominal expenditure to money holdings (the velocity of money).  While the public controls
the ratio, the central bank can control either the numerator or denominator, but not both independently.
 Depending upon its procedures, the FOMC exercises proximate control either on the numerator or
denominator.  Under actual procedures, the FOMC sets an interest rate peg.  It is convenient to
discuss its procedures under two alternative assumptions: no shocks and shocks.
With a rate peg and no shocks, the FOMC acts most directly on the rate of growth of nominal
expenditure.  Real variables determine the rate of growth of real expenditure.  The rate of growth of
nominal expenditure equals this real growth plus the public’s expectation of inflation, which is
determined by the FOMC.  The public then demands nominal money balances commensurate with
nominal expenditure growth.  Given its rate peg, the central bank accommodates the public’s demand
for nominal money.  Changes in that demand reflect changes in nominal expenditure, changes in the
opportunity cost of holding money such as changes in interest rates, and random changes. (The
denominator adjusts to the numerator in the velocity of money ratio.)
The assumption of no shocks means that the central bank is not itself a source of
disturbances.  For this assumption to hold, in setting its rate peg, the central bank must set the implicit
real rate peg equal to the natural rate (the sustainable real rate).  This requirement endows current
                     
34 Figures are for the shift-adjusted M1 used by the FOMC.  See Bennett, 1982.  Figure 6a does not show M1
growth for 1982, as the nationwide introduction of NOW accounts breaks the continuity of the M1 demand
function by making it more interest elastic.21
procedures with their characteristic flavor.  The FOMC devotes most of its effort to gathering and
assessing current information on the strength of real economic activity in order to make the funds rate
peg track the natural rate. The FOMC must also keep the public’s expectation of inflation equal to the
inflation rate it considers acceptable.  That acceptable rate determines the inflation premium in the
interest rate so that the FOMC’s rate peg equals the nominal natural rate – the natural rate plus the
public’s expectation of inflation.
Shocks arise when the rate peg set by the FOMC is inconsistent with the nominal natural rate.
 Historically, this inconsistency arose when the FOMC failed to move its funds rate peg in a way that
stabilized growth of nominal expenditure.  For example, in the stop-go period, when real expenditure
strengthened early in the recovery phase of the business cycle, the FOMC limited increases in its rate
peg by allowing monetary acceleration.  In this instance, nominal expenditure must adjust to the
increase in money.  The numerator adjusted to the denominator in the velocity of money ratio.
A key quantity theory assumption is that the functional forms for nominal money supply and
demand differ.  In the above example, the nominal money supply function, which depends upon the
difference between the FOMC’s rate peg and the nominal natural rate, shifts rightward relative to the
public’s nominal money demand schedule, which depends upon the level of the interest rate.  Because
the public ultimately cares only about real variables, the adjustment to the increase in money cannot
take the form of an increase in real expenditure and real money.  The price of money, the inverse of
the price level, must fall.
The FOMC must have some policy (articulated or implicit) about the extent to which to allow
the random monetary emissions produced by shocks to affect permanently the price level.  At one
extreme, it can add a random walk component to prices.  At the other extreme, it can maintain the
price level over time around a fixed trend line.  In the former case, determination of the price level
entails FOMC manipulation of two nominal variables: the public’s expectation of trend inflation and
changes in monetary aggregates (the monetary base and money).  Current FOMC procedures
determine the trend rate of inflation as the difference between the trend rates of growth of nominal and
real expenditure, with the former primarily dependent upon the public’s expectation of inflation.  The
price level emerges out of trend inflation and the degree of drift the FOMC allows in the price level.22
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1.  FOMC Reaction Function, February 1983 to February 1997
DFR = .24*MISS + .33*DBR + û
          (6.1)            (5.2)
CRSQ = .43   SEE = .27   DW = 1.6   DF = 112
Notes:  DFR is first differences of the FOMC's target for the funds rate immediately following an FOMC
meeting.  MISS is the level of nominal output predicted in the Greenbook minus the quarterly
benchmark level derived by applying the midpoint of the central tendency range for nominal output
growth announced at the most recent Humphrey-Hawkins hearings to the prior year's fourth quarter
value of nominal output.  If the FOMC meeting falls in the first two months of a quarter, the predicted
value is for the contemporaneous quarter.  If the meeting falls in the final month of a quarter, the
predicted value is for the subsequent quarter.  DBR is first differences of the 30-year bond rate as of the
day preceding the FOMC meeting.
CRSQ is the corrected R-squared; SEE the standard error of estimate; DW the Durbin-Watson
statistic; and DF degrees of freedom.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  Estimation is by
OLS.
Table 2.  M2 Velocity Regression, 1950 to 1990
Dln Vt = 3.4*Korea + 2.3 D(Rt - RM2t) + .54 D
2ln GDPt + t
            (3.9)             (8.2)                      (6.4)
CRSQ = .76   SEE = 1.5   DW = 1.7   DF = 37
Notes: Observations are annual averages.  V is the ratio of GDP (gross domestic product) to M2; R is
the 4-6 month commercial paper rate; RM2 is a weighted-average of the own rates of return paid on
components of M2; Korea is a shift dummy with the value 1 in 1951, 1952 and 1953 and zero
otherwise.  Before 1959, M2 is M4 in Table 1 of Friedman and Schwartz (1970).  ln is the natural
logarithm; D is the first-difference operator and D
2 the second-difference operator.
The financial market opportunity cost variable (Rt - RM2t) is entered with one contemporaneous
and one lagged term.  The estimated coefficients are, respectively, 1.12 and 1.22.  Otherwise see notes
to Table 1.25
Table 3: The Funds Rate Target Set by the FOMC and Economic Data Seen by the FOMC at Its Meetings
                           (1)         (2)           (3)           (4)          (5)           (6)          (7)           (8)           (9)          (10)          (11)           (12)          (13)
                                                             int.                                                                                                                                   D D M1       M1 step
                           FR       D D FR        D D FR        RR         D D RR        IP           D D IP        CPI         D D CPI        U            D D U            step         date
PHASE 1
Cycle 1 (12/64-11/65)      4.1                        .1                                 7.5                        1.8                           4.7                             2.8         10/65
Cycle 2 (11/66-11/67)       4.4       -1.1        -1.5           2.3          - .1           -.3        -9.0          2.9           -.4            3.9            0               7.5           2/67
Cycle 3 (2/70-3/71)        6.2       -2.7        -5.0           3.0         -1.2         -6.0        -8.5          5.5           -.5            5.1         1.5               5.3           4/70
Cycle 4 (8/74-4/77)           6.0       -3.9        -7.5           - .1         -3.0            .3        -2.2          7.6         -2.3            7.6        -2.7               5.2           4/75
PHASE 1a
Cycle 1 (12/65-6/66)        4.8          .7            .7            2.8                         9.1         1.6          3.1          1.3            3.9         - .8
Cycle 2 (12/67-3/69)       5.9        1.5          2.5            2.3            0           4.9         5.2          4.4          1.5            3.6         - .3
Cycle 3 (4/71-3/73)         4.9       -1.3          3.0            1.4        -1.6           5.2       11.2          3.5         -2.0            5.7           .6
Cycle 4 (5/78-10/79)       8.2        2.2          7.9              .7           .8           5.0         4.7          9.3          1.7            6.2        -1.4
PHASE 2
Cycle 1 (7/66-10/66)       5.5          .7             0           2.4          - .4          8.7         - .4           3.3            .2            3.9             0              -7.4           6/66
Cycle 2 (4/69-1/70)         8.9        3.0            .6           4.2          1.9          2.5        -2.4           6.0          1.6            3.6             0              -4.6           3/69
Cycle 3 (4/73-7/74)         9.9        5.0          6.0           2.9          1.5          2.5        -2.7           9.9          6.4            4.9           -.8              -4.9           3/73
Cycle 4 (11/79-5/81)       14.2        6.0          7.5          3.7          3.0            .2        -4.8         12.4          3.1            7.0            .8              -8.2         10/79
Notes:  Observations are averages across phases of the data used in Figures 6, 7 and 8, that is, data available to the FOMC at the time of its
meetings.  FR is the funds rate; RR the real rate of interest; IP the rate of growth of industrial production; U the employment rate; and M1 the
monetary aggregate M1.  D indicates the change from one phase to the next.  "int D FR" is the change in the funds rate from the first to last date of
the phases.  "M1 step date" is the date of the last observation of the preceding step.  The "D M1 step" date 4/70 is the rise from the 4/69-4/70 step
to the 3/72-3/73 step.  The "D M1 step" dated 3/73 is the fall from the 3/72 - 3/73 step to the 10/74-4/75 step.  The "M1 step" dated 4/75 is the rise
from the 10/74-4/75 step to the 5/77-11/78 step.  The "D M1 step" dated 10/79 is the fall from the 5/79-10/79 step to the 2/81-12/81 step.Table 4:  Turning Points and Lags in Data seen by the FOMC
         (1)            (2)             (3)                (4)           (5)              (6)          (7)       (8)       (9)       (10)
                                                                                                                  Lags in Months
Peaks                M1               Ind.             Funds           Real              U                          M1-       M1-        M1-        IP-
Troughs                 Step                  Prod.                    Rate              Rate                  Rate                Inflation             IP          FR         CPI         RR
 P (1)        6/66 (6.4)       9/66(10.0)       10/66(5.6)       1/67(3.8)                    12/66(4.3)            3                                 4
 T (2)       2/67(-1.0)       5/67(-6.4)       11/67(4.0)      11/67(1.2)                     1/68 (3.1)           3          9           11             6
 P (2)        3/69 (6.5)        9/69 (8.4)        1/70 (9.2)       1/70 (5.3)     1/70 (3.4)        6/70 (6.5)            6        10          15             4
 T (3)        4/70 (2.0)      1/71(-16.4)        2/72 (3.3)       1/72 (0)       6/72 (5.9)        2/73 (3.2)            9        22           34           12
 P (3)        3/73 (7.3)       10/73(5.9)        7/74 (13)        7/74 (4.1)    11/73(4.5)      12/74(13.9)           7        16            7             9
                              9/74(2.6)                                                                    11
 T (4)        4/75(2.4)      4/75(-32.5)        3/77 (4.6)       7/77 (-1)      6/75 (9.2)        2/77 (4.0)             0        23         22          27
 P (4)       11/78(7.6)        4/79 (3.5)       5/81 (20.0)      5/81 (9.4)      4/80 (6.2)       4/80 (19.6)            5        31          18          25
            10/79(10.1)       3/80 (2.4)                                                                                     5
Notes:  The dates (month/year) correspond to significant turning points in the series shown in Figures 6, 7 and 8, that is, in data available to the
FOMC at the time of its meetings.  The numbers in parentheses are the values at those turning points.  For each of the 4 cycles shown in Figures
6, 7 and 8, the "Lags in Months" observations show the lags, respectively, between turning points in M1 growth and industrial production growth
(IP), in M1 growth and industrial production growth (IP), in M1 growth and the funds rate (FR), in M1 growth and inflation (CPI), and industrial
production growth and the real rate of interest (RR).28
Table 5:  Step Function, Nominal Output Growth and the Funds Rate
             Nominal GDP            Funds Rate                 Lag in        Change in
              Peak, Trough           Peak, Trough              Quarter             M1 Step
P          1966 Q1 (12.8%)         1966 Q4 (5.6%)          3               -5.2
T         1967 Q2 (3.1%)          1967 Q4 (4.2%)           2                   5.2
P          1969 Q1 (10/7%)         1969 Q4 (8.9%)           3            -4.2
T          1970 Q4 (1.4%)          1972 Q1 (3.5%)           5                   5.31
P          1973 Q4(13.2%)          1974 Q3 (12.1%)         3                           -3.7
2
T          1975 Q1 (2.4%)          1977 Q1 (4.7%)           8                   4.5
3
P          1980 Q1 (11.5%)        1981 Q3 (17.6%)          6                           -3.3
4
1From 1969Q2-1970Q2 step to 1972Q1-1973Q1 step
2From 1972Q1-1973Q1 step to 1974Q2-1975Q1 step
3From 1974Q2-1975Q1 step to 1976Q4-1978Q4 step
4From 1976Q4-1979Q3 step to 1979Q4-1981Q4 step
Notes:  The dates correspond to the turning points in the series shown in Figure 9, which uses currently
available time series.  The numbers in parentheses are the values at those turning points.  The lags
show the quarters elapsed from turning points in nominal GDP growth and the funds rate. The "change
in M1 Step" refers to the difference between the M1 steps shown in Figure 9.Figure 1
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Notes: Predicted nominal output growth is an estimate of the annualized quarterly rate of growth of nominal output (GNP) available at FOMC 
meetings.  If an FOMC meeting is in one of the first two months of a quarter, the prediction is for the contemporaneous quarter.  If the meeting is in 
the last month of a quarter, the prediction is for the succeeding quarter.  Predictions are from the Greenbook.  Targeted nominal output growth is 
the midpoint of the central tendency range of fourth quarter to fourth quarter growth rates predicted by FOMC members and presented at the 
February or July Humphrey-Hawkins Hearings.  As of the July FOMC meeting, the target is inferred from the revised central tendency range for 
yearly growth and from estimated growth over the first two quarters.  Observations correspond to FOMC meetings and letters indicate month in 
which the FOMC meeting was held.  Heavy tick marks indicate a December meeting.  
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Misses from Target of Quarterly Nominal Output Growth 






























































Change in Funds Rate
Miss in Growth Target
Notes: Misses from target are the differences between the predicted and targeted values shown in previous figure.  Left scale is for the 1980-1982 
period.  Right scale is for the subsequent period.  Through the October 1981 FOMC meeting, the funds rate is the actual average value in the first full 
statement week following an FOMC meeting.  Thereafter, it is the value determined by the FOMC at its meetings.  Changes in the funds rate are 
multiplied by three.  Diamonds mark the following dates: 1) March 1980, 2) May 1981, 3) February 1982, 4) May 1984, 5) August 1985, 6) May 1987, 


































Notes: monthly observations of the funds rate and the 30-year bond rate.  Diamonds mark the following dates: March 1980, May 1981, 
February 1982, May 1984, August 1985, May 1987, and December 1988.  Heavy tick marks indicate December.Figure 4


















30yr. Bond Rate (left scale)
Real GDP (right scale)
Notes: Real GDP growth is quarterly observations of 4-quarter percentage changes in real GDP.  The bond rate is lagged 4 quarters and 
graphed with an inverted scale.  Heavy tick marks indicate last quarter of year.  Figure 5
Annual Nominal Output Growth







































Notes:  Predictions of nominal output growth are from the M2 indicator variable Dm + Dv
p, where Dm is the percentage growth in M2 and Dv
p 
is the predicted percentage growth in M2 velocity due to changes in the financial market opportunity cost of holding M2.  Actual nominal 
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Notes: Data correspond to monthly FOMC meetings. M1 growth is the three-month annualized growth rate ending in the month prior to an FOMC meeting 
available to the FOMC at the time of its meetings.  The M1 step function is fitted to this series.  For the dates 7/30/63 through 10/20/70 and for 11/20/79, 
the funds rate is the actual average value in the first full statement week following an FOMC meeting.  Otherwise, it is the value set by the FOMC at its 
meeting.  Dark dots mark changes in M1 steps.  Cross-hatched dots mark significant turning points in funds rate series.  If two FOMC meetings occur in a 
month, the first is used.  For 1979, the observations correspond to the nine FOMC meetings.  Heavy tick marks indicate last FOMC meeting of the year. 
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Notes: For the dates 11/20/79 through 10/6/81, the funds rate is the actual average value in the first full 
statement week following an FOMC meeting.  Otherwise, it is the value set by the FOMC at its meeting.  M1 is 
shift-adjusted M1 for 1981 (Bennett 1982).  Otherwise, see notes to Figure 6.
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CPI Inflation (left scale) 
Unemployment Rate (right scale)
 
Notes: Data correspond to monthly FOMC meetings.  Inflation is the most recent three-month annualized growth rate of the CPI (generally ending in the 
month two-months prior to an FOMC meeting) available to the FOMC at the time of its meeting.  The unemployment rate is the most recent rate (generally 
in the month prior to an FOMC meeting) available to the FOMC at the time of its meetings.  Dark dots mark significant turning points in the CPI series; 
cross-hatched dots in unemployment series.  The dashed line is at four percent.  If two FOMC meetings occur in a month, the first one is used.  For 1979, 
observations correspond to the nine FOMC meetings.  Heavy tick marks indicate last FOMC meeting of the year.  
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CPI Inflation (left scale)
Unemployment Rate (right
scale)
Notes: Data correspond to FOMC meetings.  See notes to Figure 7.
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Industrial Production (left scale)
Real Rate (right scale)
Notes: Data correspond to monthly FOMC meetings. Growth in industrial production is the most recent three-month annualized growth rate 
(generally ending in the month prior to an FOMC meeting) available to the FOMC at the time of its meetings.  The real rate of interest is the 
commercial paper rate minus Board of Governors staff forecasts of inflation contained in the Greenbook.  If two FOMC meetings occur in a month, 
the first is used. For 1979, the observations correspond to the nine FOMC meetings.  Dark dots mark significant turning points in industrial 
production series; cross-hatched dots in real rate series. Heavy tick marks indicate last FOMC meeting of the year.  
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Industrial Production (left scale)
Real Rate (right scale)
Notes: October 1979 real rate observation is missing as there was no Greeenbook (Board staff 
inflation forecast) for that FOMC meeting.  Otherwise, see notes to figure 8.  
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Notes: Quarterly observations of annualized, quarterly nominal GDP growth and the funds rate.  Data are currently available time series.  The M1 steps 
are an average of the annualized quarterly M1 growth rates.  M1 is "shift adjusted" M1 for 1981. Dark dots mark changes in nominal output growth.  
Cross-hatched dots mark significant turning points in funds rate.  Heavy tick marks indicate fourth quarter.  
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Monetary Policy and the ESCB
What should the ESCB adopt as its operational procedures for implementing MP?  The current
debate has been put in terms of inflation targeting versus money targeting.  The debate appears trivial.
The ESCB will start with an inflation target, and it will then use an interest rate as its instrument.
However, as emphasized by Milton Friedman, a central bank cannot control inflation directly.
Once actual inflation deviates from target, bringing it back to target is costly.  For example, in early 1969
the FOMC raised its interest rate peg sharply to lower inflation.  Not until two years later, in summer
1971, did inflation begin to fall.  The ESCB should then use various variables as information variables
that tell it when to change its rate peg so that it can maintain inflation on target.  If money demand is
stable, the central bank can use the information contained in the behavior of money to help in setting its
interest rate peg.
The actual debate therefore appears to be over whether the ESCB should communicate to the
public like the Bank of England or like the Bundesbank.  Of course, the debate has been a formal
debate, rather than a substantive one.  The ESCB will look like the Bundesbank.
The Bundesbank has demonstrated the usefulness of money targets as a way of
communicating to the public.  Money targets convey to the public the fact that the central bank controls
only paper money creation, or its modern-day equivalent: the electronic money on the books of banks.
Central banks do not create wealth.  Therefore, their ability to control real economic activity is limited.
However, money growth is generally not in itself a complete guide to the impact of monetary
policy, considered as the nominal (dollar) expenditure of the public.  Money targeting by itself has only
rarely constituted an operational set of monetary policy procedures.  One reason is that money demand
is highly interest sensitive.  As a consequence, at times when interest rates change, much of the impact
of monetary policy on the expenditure of the public occurs through changes in velocity rather than
through changes in the quantity of money.
For example, in the US in the decade of the 1980s, M2 growth was fairly stable.  Much of the
variation in the nominal expenditure of the public came from changes in velocity that in turn derived
from the change in market interest rates, which  affected the cost of holding M2.  Also, because of the
interest sensitivity of money demand, the behavior of money often offers a poor mechanism for
communicating to the public the need for changes in the central bank’s interest rate peg.  For example
in 1994 in the US, it was clear that interest rates had to rise.  Because the rise in interest rates raised
M2 velocity, M2 had to grow at a low level for a while to maintain moderate growth of dollar expenditure.
So money growth was low while the FOMC was raising the funds rate.
The ESCB should establish a hierarchy of variables „in between” its instrument (the repurchase
rate) and its objective (a stable price level or a low inflation rate).  It should set a benchmark for the
trend rate of growth of money.  Like the inflation target set now by the Bundesbank Bank, it should be a
point target based on an estimate of the trend rate of growth of velocity and real output.  This long-run
money target would be useful for communication.  It would explain to the public how the CB, as the42
creator of money, ultimately dominates all other influences on the price level and controls the price
level.
However, by itself, the long-run money target is not likely to explain much of the variation in the
central bank’s rate peg.  By itself then, it could appear more as a smokescreen than a useful means of
communicating.  The ESCB should formulate two informational variables to guide the setting of its
interest rate peg.
First, it should specify a value for money growth, adjusted for changes in velocity that can be
predicted from the behavior of interest rates.  If money demand is stable, misses in this variable offer
information on the likely dollar expenditure of the public.  However, the ESCB must collect data on the
interest rates paid on the components of the monetary aggregate it will target (M3).  The behavior of
velocity depends upon the difference between market rates and the own rate on money.
Second, the ESCB should specify a value for the rate of growth of nominal expenditure.  If
money demand is unstable, the ESCB would use this variable exclusively as a guide to setting its
repurchase rate.  Both these variables are nominal.  Therefore, their use in the policy process can be
explained within the common analytical framework of the quantity theory.2008
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